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The $10 million NH BetterBuildings program was funded by the United States Department of Energy 
(DOE) through an American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) grant awarded to, and administered 
by, the New Hampshire Office of Energy and Planning (OEP) and managed by the NH Community 
Development Finance Authority (CDFA).  The program started in July 2010 and the last projects were 
completed in August 2013.    
 The program’s objective was to achieve transformative reductions in energy use by creating more 
efficient residential and commercial buildings throughout the communities of Berlin, Nashua, and 
Plymouth, also known as beacon communities.   The program sought to accomplish these goals through 
neighbor-to-neighbor education, technical assistance, and low-interest loans and project incentives. 
While originally focused on these three communities, the program did expand to include projects 
throughout the state.  
This analysis includes 54 of the 69 (78%) commercial projects and 734 of the 808 (91%) residential 
projects at a total retrofit cost of $10.8 million that resulted in $1.0 million in annual savings.1  The 
commercial projects were primarily beacon community-based, but did include seven projects that were 
the result of the response to a state-wide request for proposals (RFP).  Residential projects were divided 
into three categories: 1) low-income (beacon community only), 2) beacon community based, and 3) 
utility (state-wide program). 
Over a three year period of the program, the $10.8 million spent on retrofit activity generated 72 direct 
full-time equivalent jobs and 72 indirect and induced full-time equivalent jobs in the NH economy—for a 
total of 144 jobs.  The project activity resulted in $7.6 million in labor income in NH and $10.3 million in 
economic value-added to the NH economy.  The program significantly impacted the NH commercial and 
residential construction sector accounting for over 50% of the jobs and wages generated.   
NH BetterBuilding project characteristics:2 
x The “typical” (commercial or residential) energy efficiency project had an 8 to 11 year payback without 
incentives; with incentives the payback was in the range of 4 to 5 years.3 
x The “typical” residential project cost $5,500 with an estimated annual energy savings of $650.  
x The “typical” commercial customer could be described as a “main street” type business.  The “typical” 
commercial energy efficiency project cost $40,000 and had an estimated annual savings of $3,000.   
x  In general, projects that took loans were associated with projects that had higher costs, slightly higher 
savings, slightly higher incentives, and longer paybacks.   
 
                                                          
1 The majority of projects completed are included in this analysis; however data was not available for all projects at 
the time of this analysis.   
2 The “typical” project refers to projects that are representative of the median as opposed to the mean out of all 
projects.   There is a more detailed discussion in the analysis section of the use of the median over the mean in the 
evaluation. 
3 Incentives included all rebates and grants from all sources including NH BetterBuildings and the utility companies. 
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A sensitivity analysis was performed on a “typical” commercial and residential project to determine 
what factors most impact project payback.  The results indicate that the most important factor for 
reducing payback was to reduce the total cost of the project. 4   The next two factors of relatively equal 
importance were project incentive and energy savings.  Varying the loan characteristics of loan amount, 
term, or interest rate had almost no impact on payback.  
When incentives are included, both residential and commercial projects, whether or not they utilized 
loans, exhibited strong rates of return over time frames of seven years or greater (potentially as high as 
60%).5  NH BetterBuildings staff reported low consumer adoption of a financing mix consisting only of a 
loan product. For energy efficiency projects to be attractive to customers, it appears that it is necessary 
to utilize incentives so that the payback of the project is on the order of 4 to 5 years.  Current energy 
prices would need to be three times higher in order for the majority of projects to approach that level of 
payback.6 
Recommendations for future energy efficiency programs : 
x There is a role for programs like NH BetterBuildings, but they should integrate with other energy efficiency 
programs offered in the state.  Characteristics of any new program offered should include: consistency, 
stability, and longevity.  Future programs should provide a value-add or address an un-met need (such as focus 
on a specific customer-type or fuel-type) that complements but does not duplicate existing programs to 
enhance total energy reduction services offered in New Hampshire. 
x Programs should place emphasis on project cost reduction.  This includes developing business processes that 
take advantage of economies of scale, contractor performance monitoring, stream-lined integration with 
existing energy efficiency programs, and centralized project information management systems.   
x Incentives need to be part of the financing mix. A potential option could be an incentive based on payback that 
is capped at a certain amount.  Payback could be determined at a project or efficiency measure scope. 
x Loans (even at conventional interest rates) are an attractive financing option as they can significantly reduce 
the upfront expenditure for a customer even if there is a slight reduction in the rate of return of the 
investment.   
x Programs benefit by offering both project management and technical assistance. 
Based on the cost information collected from NH BetterBuildings, a good rule of thumb for estimating 
program costs would be $4 million to retrofit every 100 “main-street” style commercial projects (30% 
for loans, 70% for incentives) and $400 thousand to retrofit every 100 residential projects (30% for 
loans, 70% for incentives). The total estimated retrofit cost for 100 commercial projects is $4 million and 
for 100 residential projects is $500 thousand.  The difference between retrofit cost and program cost 
reflects the amount customers would pay upfront for projects, indicating that overall businesses mostly 
borrow to pay for costs not covered by incentives while residential customers are more likely to put in 
some of their own money.    
                                                          
4 Payback is defined as cost divided by savings.  Cost incorporates different factors depending on the analysis 
performed.   Cost methodologies are explained further on in the report. 
5 Based on calculations of internal rate of return.  Technically, this is the annualized effective compounded return 
rate that makes the net present value (NPV) of all positive and negative cash flows  equal to zero.   
6 Assuming no escalation in project cost, in reality, the construction industry is highly energy dependent and total 
project cost would be expected to rise with rising fuel prices. 





This study was sponsored to provide data analysis services for the NH BetterBuildings program in the 
following areas:  
Ɣ quantify the economic impact of energy efficiency projects completed by the NH BetterBuildings 
program; 
Ɣ investigate the role of finance mechanisms (loans and grants) in driving project adoption for 
residential and commercial energy efficiency projects; and 
Ɣ summarize lessons learned from the program that may be useful in the design of future 
statewide energy efficiency programs.  
The CDFA contracted with Seacoast Economics, LLC for this project and the research team consisted of 
Matthew Magnusson, Dr. Cameron Wake, and Corey Johnson (see Appendix A for additional discussion 
of the credentials of the research team).  The team performed a rapid evaluation of the total economic 
impact (direct, indirect, and induced) of the NH BetterBuildings project on the NH economy.  The 
analysis included: employment, tax revenue implications, and other associated value added benefits of 
the energy efficiency projects and how those benefits were multiplied out through the state economy.   
Sensitivity analysis was performed to identify key factors for energy efficiency projects specifically in the 
context of low-interest loans.  The dependent variable analyzed for sensitivity was simple payback when 
a range of loan costs and incentives were analyzed.  Cash flow and internal rates of return were also 
provided to illustrate the financial performance of commercial and residential projects.  Additional 
scenarios related to loan interest rates, fuel prices, and incentive levels were also conducted. 
The research team analyzed surveys and interviews conducted by NH BetterBuildings staff and a study 
conducted by Plymouth State University to help identify best practices for future energy efficiency 
programs in New Hampshire. 
 
  





In July 2010, an $8.5 million contract was entered into between the NH Office of Energy & Planning 
(grant recipient) and the NH Community Development Finance Authority (CDFA)— a quasi-state 
agency— for the CDFA to manage the program.   The purpose of the NH BetterBuildings program was to 
jump start the New Hampshire Beacon Communities Project; an initiative designed to empower the 
communities of Berlin, Nashua, and Plymouth to achieve transformative reductions in fossil fuel use and 
greenhouse gases through deep energy retrofits and complementary sustainable energy solutions in the 
residential, commercial, municipal, and industrial sectors. The program sought to accomplish these goals 
through neighbor-to-neighbor education, technical assistance, and low-interest loans and project 
incentives. 
Other partners included the cities of Berlin and Nashua, the Town of Plymouth, Public Service of New 
Hampshire (PSNH), Unitil, Retail Merchants Association of New Hampshire, the New Hampshire Electric 
Coop (NHEC), and the Southern NH Services and Tri-County Community Action Agency.   
Residential project activity began in the second quarter of 2011, followed by commercial project activity 
in the first quarter of 2012. The original program was loan-based, but due to slow customer adoption, 
grants were added to incent development. During the second quarter of 2012, the OEP received 
Department of Energy (DOE) approval to expand the residential and commercial programs statewide.   
As a result of this approval, in the spring of 2012, a state-wide competitive RFP was issued for 
commercial and municipal energy efficiency projects, and in the third quarter of 2012, the CDFA 
completed the transition of the BetterBuildings residential program in Berlin, Nashua, and Plymouth to a 
statewide partnership with State utilities. The utility partnership involved three utilities (PSNH, Unitil 
and the New Hampshire Electric Cooperative) to incorporated BetterBuilding funds into the Home 
Performance with Energy Star (HPwES) program, a nationwide home efficiency program administered by 
the DOE and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
At the end of the second quarter of 2013, the NH BetterBuildings program had completed 69 
commercial projects and 808 residential energy efficiency projects.  The program completed remaining 
low-income energy efficiency projects by mid-August 2013. In order to promote continued 
improvements in energy efficiency, program administrators are currently working to implement a 
revolving loan fund that will operate after the grant period. 
Not all projects completed by NH BetterBuildings are included in this analysis, as the analysis was 
performed on project data available as of June 2013. The analysis included 54 of the 69 (78%) 
commercial projects and 734 of the 808 (91%) residential projects.   The majority of commercial projects 
were beacon community-based, but there were seven projects outside of those communities that were 
brought in as part of a state-wide RFP process.  The residential projects were divided into three main 
categories: 1) low-income – 100% grant, through Community Action Agencies to help more low-income, 
2) beacon community-based general customers, and 3) utility.   




Table 1:  Categories of projects analyzed 
Category Description 
Commercial Commercial projects in the beacon communities or brought in 
through a state-wide RFP process.  
Residential: Low-income Low-income program with work performed by Southern NH 
Services and Tri-County Community Action Agency. 100% grant 
funded EE measures; there was no cost to home owner.  Program 
required all cost-effective weatherization measures be installed. 
Residential: Community-based Open to all residential customers in the beacon communities.  
Financing mix included: low-interest loans through banks, 
incentives from NH BetterBuildings, and utility incentives. 
BetterBuildings provided rebates/incentives between $250 and 
$1,000 to homeowner.  Rebate amount dependent on energy 
savings. 
Residential: Utility Statewide initiative managed by PSNH, Unitil, and NHEC.  
BetterBuildings funds were used to expand the existing HPwES 
program to provide rebates to homeowners of 50% up to $4,000.  
Participants could also apply for on-bill financing up to $20,000 at 
0% interest.  
 
The fact that the residential projects were divided into three different categories and managed in 
different ways provides some basis for benchmark comparison in regards to cost and energy savings.  
 
NH BetterBuildings Organizational Structure 
 
The NH BetterBuildings program was funded by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) through 
an American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) grant awarded to, and administered by, the New 
Hampshire Office of Energy and Planning (OEP). OEP contracted with the Community Development 
Finance Authority (CDFA) to implement the project. The program’s organizational structure consisted of 
a Program Director and Assistant Program Director at CDFA headquarters in Concord, plus three 
community offices.  The Program Director was responsible for overseeing the work at the Community 
Offices, program development and close program coordination with the OEP. The Assistant Program 
Director reported to the Program Director.   
The CDFA established a field office in each community which was staffed by a Community Manager and 
Technical Advisor. The Community Manager was assigned to a specific community and was responsible 
for local program management outreach, and coordination.  The Technical Advisor served as an advisor 
and advocate for home and business owners during the efficiency retrofit process and were more 
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focused at the project implementation level. The Technical Advisor also served as a direct liaison for 
contractors and auditors.    
Field offices worked with the local municipalities, property owners, financial institutions and building 
contractors. Each Community Manager reported to the Assistant Program Director.  The Assistant 
Program Director worked directly with each Community Manager and Technical Advisor to help manage 
their projects.  Technical Advisors reported to their respective Community Manager, although the two 
positions provided mutual support for each other. 
  





The analysis included 54 of the 69 commercial projects and 734 of the 808 residential projects at a total 
retrofit cost of $10.8 million that resulted in $1.0 million in annual savings. An overview of the project 
types is discussed in the introduction. 
Data verification and correction was performed for all commercial projects, and community-based 
residential projects.  No data verification was performed for low-income and utility residential projects 
due to time constraints of the study.  Twelve projects had wood fuel savings but they were excluded 
from this analysis as they were a small contributor to dollar savings relative to the other fuel categories.  
Specific types of energy efficiency or other fossil-fuel based energy reduction measures were not 
considered in this analysis. Savings are based on stated energy savings from audits as recorded by NH 
BetterBuildings staff.   
The study assumed constant energy prices. Table 8 lists the assumed energy prices for calculating annual 
energy savings in dollars.  The same energy price was applied to both commercial and residential 
projects.  Inflation is not directly included in any of the financial models developed for the study.  
Payback is the project retrofit cost (does not include audit costs) divided by annual energy savings.  The 
actual retrofit cost used varies slightly across some analysis but assumptions are stated for each 
analysis.   
 
Table 2: Summary project information 
Category Number of 
Projects 





(Primarily community-based) 54          $   5,969,000              $    461,000  
Residential 734          $   4,804,000              $    574,400  
   -Low-income 143           $      942,100              $    131,800  
   -Community-based 197          $   1,545,000              $    140,000  
   -Utility 394          $   2,317,000              $    301,900  
Total 788          $ 10,774,100           $ 1,035,400  
 
Mean values are used in some of the analysis presented in this report; however, the data had a few 
significant outlier projects that significantly skewed mean values. In addition, some projects appeared to 
have inaccurate values and there was insufficient time or data to correct those values.  This is especially 
apparent for calculating payback values.  Instead median costs, along with a range of values were used.7  
Median values are believed to provide the most accurate picture of a “typical” residential and “main-
                                                          
7 Median and mean are two measures of central tendency, or the “average” value.  Means are effective at 
describing central tendency when the range of values follow a normal distribution.  The mean is the sum of values 
in a collection divided by the total number of observations in that collection.  The median is employed when a few 
outlier values significantly alter that central tendency.  The median is the numerical value that separates the lower 
half of a collection from the upper half. It is calculated by rank ordering all values and selecting the value in the 
middle.  
An Evaluation of the NH BetterBuildings Program 
10 
 
street” commercial project in this program and help avoid potential problems caused by outlier projects 
and incorrect data.8 
Median cost per commercial project was $39,000 with a median annual energy savings of $3,000. 
Median cost per residential project was $5,400 with a median annual energy savings of $660.   At 
current energy prices, the median payback for commercial projects completed disregarding incentives 
was 10.5 years; the median payback for commercial projects completed including incentives was 5.0 
years.  The median payback for residential projects completed disregarding incentives was 8.1 years; the 
median payback for residential projects completed with incentives and excluding low-income was 3.8 
years.  
Table 3: Project cost by project category 
Category 







(Primarily community-based) $110,500 $   39,000 $  4,200 $ 836,497 
Residential  $    6 ,500 $     5,400 $      290 $   32,100 
   -Low-Income $    6,600 $     5,900 $      450 $   19,200 
   -Community-based $    7,800 $     4,900 $      500 $   32,100 
   -Utility $    5,880 $     5,400 $      290 $   24,000 
 











(Primarily community-based) $    8,500 $  3,000 $  480 $ 112,800 
Residential  $780     $     660 $40       $ 4,300   
   -Low-Income $    920 $     840 $      50 $   2,500 
   -Community-based $    730 $     530 $      140 $   4,300 
   -Utility $    790 $     660 $      40 $   4,100 
 
  
                                                          
8 The term “main-street” for commercial projects, indicates they appeared to be smaller businesses, including 
professional services and smaller retail, as opposed to large manufacturing or corporate customers.  A specific 
analysis of commercial customer type was not performed in this analysis.   
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(Primarily community-based) 27.0 10.5 
Residential  13.3 8.1 
   -Low-Income 9.1 7.5 
   -Community-based 14.1 9.9 
   -Utility 14.5 7.5 
 






(Primarily community-based) 17 5.0 
Residential  8.4 3.8 
   -Low-Income - - 
   -Community-based 7.8 3.2 
   -Utility 8.7 3.9 
 
Out of the residential programs, the low-income and utility programs had identical median paybacks 
without incentives for projects at 7.5 years, but the community-based residential programs had a higher 
median payback of 9.9 years.  However, the median cost for community-based projects was lower than 
low-income or the utility projects.  This could indicate that certain types of measures that were installed 
in the low-income or utility programs that may have not been installed in the community-based 
programs.   
Annual energy savings from the portfolio of projects analyzed was 1.4 million kWh of electricity, 203,000 
therms of natural gas, 113,500 gallons of heating oil, 34,000 gallons of propane, and 3,400 gallons of 
kerosene.   













based)            1,014,200                 133,500                   15,500             21,100                    -    
Residential                399,600                   69,300                   98,000             12,900             3,400  
   - Low-income                178,900                   27,300                   15,200               1,500             1,600  
   - Community-based                  47,200                   32,000                   22,300               1,600                 700  
    -Utility                173,400                   10,000                   60,400               9,700             1,100  




                                                          
9 Low-income was excluded from calculating median paybacks with incentives, as there was no cost to low-income 
participants.  
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Table 8: Energy cost assumptions 
Energy Type Unit Cost per unit 
Natural Gas Therm $1.29  
Propane Gallon 3.31 
Oil Gallon 3.72 
Electric kWh $0.159  
Kerosene Gallon $4.19  
 
As a result of the work performed in the NH BetterBuildings program, at current energy prices, NH 
businesses are saving $161,300 on electricity (35% of the total cost savings experienced by the 
commercial sector for completed NH BetterBuildings projects), $172,200 on natural gas (37% of total 
commercial cost savings), $57,700 on propane on heating oil (13% of total commercial cost savings) and 
$69,800 on propane (15% of total commercial cost savings) annually.  Residences are saving $63,500 on 
electricity (11% of total residential cost savings), $89,500 on natural gas (16% of total residential cost 
savings from completed NH BetterBuildings projects), $364,600 on heating oil (63% of total residential 
cost savings), $42,700 on propane (7% of total residential cost savings), and $14,200 on kerosene (2% of 
total residential cost savings) annually.  The savings from the reduction in heating oil in the residential 
sector stands out as an area of noteworthy savings for this program. 
Table 9: Total annual energy cost savings by project category  
Category Electricity Natural Gas Heating Oil Propane Kerosene 
Commercial 
(Primarily community-
based) $ 161,300 $ 172,200 $   57,700 $   69,800  -    
Residential $   63,500 $   89,400 $ 364,600 $   42,700 $ 14,200 
   -Low-income $   28,400 $   35,200 $   56,500 $     5,000 $   6,700 
   -Community-based $     7,500 $   41,300 $   83,000 $     5,300 $   2,900 
   -Utility $   27,600 $   12,900 $ 224,700 $   32,100 $   4,600 
Total $ 224,800 $ 261,700 $ 422,200 $ 112,500 $ 14,200 
 
Within the residential project types, the program offered through the utility companies throughout the 
state accounted for the highest number of projects and total energy savings.  The utility residential 
program accounted for just over 50% of the total number of residential projects, and approximately 50% 
of the total savings in energy costs. The established utility programs have the infrastructure and capacity 
to deliver significant energy efficiency project results.  This was also seen in the NH Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions reduction fund, where in the first year of the program’s existence (2009-2010), the electric 
utilities through the RECORE program was the single largest contributor of energy reductions and 
contributed over 90% of the electricity reductions.10 This highlights the productivity of an established 
energy efficiency program and supports the concept of managing for consistency and longevity of 
energy efficiency programs in the state. 
                                                          
10“ NH Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Fund Year 1 (July 2009-June 2010) Evaluation,” Carbons Solutions 
New England, 2011,  Available online at 
http://www.puc.nh.gov/Sustainable%20Energy/GHGERF/Evaulations/GHGERF_Year1_Report_11Feb2009.pdf 
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For commercial customers, the median loan amount per project was $20,000, and the average incentive 
(grants and rebates from all sources) was $17,100.  For residential customers, the median loan amount 
was $3,600, and the median incentive was $2,800.  
Table 10: Total and median loans and incentives for projects analyzed 
Category 
Total Loans` Total Incentives 
(Grants & rebates 
from all sources) 
Median Loan Median 
Incentive11 
Commercial 
(Primarily community-based) $ 2,336,300 $ 2,612,000 $ 20,000 $   17,100 
Residential $ 1,494,500 $ 2,517,700 $   3,600 $     2,800 
   -Low-income $                  - $    942,100 $            - $     5,900 
   -Community-based $    797,800 $    636,900 $   6,900 $     2,300 
   -Utility $    696,700 $    938,700 $   3,200 $     2,500 
 
Table 11 shows project financing characteristics for commercial and residential projects (excluding low-
income) segmented by those that included loans in their financial mix and those that did not include 
loans.  Table 12 segments the utility and community-based residential programs on those that utilized 
loans and those that did not utilize loans.  For both the commercial and residential projects, in general, 
loans were associated with projects that had higher costs, slightly higher savings, slightly higher 
incentives, and longer median paybacks.   
Table 11: Commercial and residential projects by loan utilization 
Category 


















No loan 19 $ 17,400 $ 2,900 - $   9,600 9.3 4.6 
Loan 35 $ 49,900 $ 3,100 $ 20,000 $ 19,400 12.4 6.2 
Residential12 
No loan 346 $   4,300 $    600 - $   2,300 7.0 2.7 
Loan 245 $   6,900 $    650 $   3,600 $   2,700 10.0 6.0 
 
Sixty-five percent of the commercial projects and 42 percent of the residential projects utilized loans in 
financing projects.  The community-based and utility programs provided data for comparison of cost, 
savings, loan, and incentive comparison.  The community-based residential programs that did not use 
loans tended to be lower cost but also resulted in lower energy savings than the utility programs that 
did not use loans.  The community-based residential programs that did utilize loans were substantially 
higher in cost than the utility programs that did utilize loans and while the savings with the community-
based tended to be slightly higher, they still overall tended to have lower payback periods than the 
utility programs.  
  
                                                          
11 Residential median incentive excludes low-income 
12 Residential excludes low-income 
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Table 12: Community-based and utility residential programs by loan utilization 
Category 

















No loan 93 2,700 300 - 2,200 8.7 1.6 
Loan 104 10,000 690 6,900 2,900 12.9 9.0 
Utility 
No loan 253 5,000 670 - 2,900 6.5 3.3 




The IMPLAN model—a widely used economic evaluation tool (discussed in detail in Appendix B)—was 
used to determine total economic impact on the NH economy from the analyzed energy efficiency 
projects.  IMPLAN 3.0 (2010 NH state data) was used to model direct, indirect, and induced economic 
impacts. The purpose of the modeling was to help understand the economic impacts energy efficiency 
programs, as represented by the NH BetterBuildings program, can have on the NH economy. 
The total retrofit cost of projects analyzed was $10.8 million.  This generated 72 direct jobs and 72 
indirect and inducted jobs in the NH economy—for a total of 144 jobs.  The project activity resulted in 
$7.6 million in labor income in NH and $10.3 million in economic value-added to the NH economy. 
Table 13: Total economic impact of NH BetterBuildings on the NH economy 
Impact Type Employment Labor Income Value Added 
Direct Effect 72 $4,364,000 $4,825,000  
Indirect Effect 23 $1,173,000  $1,732,000  
Induced Effect 49 $2,057,000  $3,696,000  
Total Effect 144 $7,595,000  $10,254,000  
 
The IMPLAN model predicted 6.7 FTE direct jobs per million spent. This figure produced by IMPLAN is 
supported by an analysis of Davis-Bacon wages from NH BetterBuildings projects which showed 
approximately 3.3 FTE jobs per million spent on commercial projects and 7.5 FTE jobs per million spent 
on residential projects.  This is also similar to values reported from the America Recover and 
Reinvestment Act funding from the Department of Energy, which recorded 4.0 FTE jobs per million spent 
which likely does not include all direct wages generated by a project.13 
Over 50% of the employment impact (78 jobs), over 60% of the labor income impact ($4.7 million in 
income) and over 50% of the economic value-added ($5.5 million) is experienced in the construction 
sector.  Restaurants and other food and drink service establishments were the next most impacted in 
terms of employment at 6 jobs.   
 
 
                                                          
13 Through June 2012, ARRA funded $23.8 billion Dept of Energy projects that resulted in 95,751 FTE jobs.  
http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/RecipientReportedData/Pages/JobSummary.aspx   
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Table 14: Top ten industries impacted by NH BetterBuildings  
Implan 
Sector Description Employment Labor Income Value Added 
39 Maintenance and repair construction of nonresidential structures 49 $2,246,000  $2,835,000  
40 Maintenance and repair construction of residential structures 29 $2,425,000  $2,688,000  
413 Food services and drinking places 6 $126,000  $192,000  
369 Architectural, engineering, and related services 4 $251,000  $255,000  
324 Retail Stores - Food and beverage 3 $84,000  $121,000  
360 Real estate establishments 3 $51,000  $369,000  
397 Private hospitals 3 $189,000  $207,000  
329 Retail Stores - General merchandise 3 $73,883  $115,000  
394 Offices of physicians, dentists, and other health practitioners 3 $236,000  $244,000  
319 Wholesale trade businesses 2 $202,000  $359,000  
 
The projects also generate state and local tax activity accounting for almost a half-million in taxes.   
Table 15: Total State and Local Tax 
Employer Paid Taxes Indirect Business Tax Property Tax Corporations 
Total 
$8,700  $321,800  $70,700  $76,400  $477,600 
 
Table 16 summarizes the inputs used in the IMPLAN model.  The model includes the sales in the 
construction sector to implement the projects, the annual energy savings in the commercial and 
residential sectors, and the reduction in payments to energy providers that result from the energy 
efficiency savings. 
Table 16: IMPLAN model inputs 
Implan Category Input Value Represents 
39 Maintenance and repair construction of non-
residential structures  $        5,969,000  
Commercial energy efficiency work 
40 Maintenance and repair construction of 
residential structures  $        4,804,000  
Residential energy efficiency work 
1003 Households 15-25k  $            131,800  
Low-income residential energy savings 
1006 Households 50-75k  $            442,600  
All other residential energy savings 
6001 Proprietor Income  $            461,000  
Commercial energy savings 
31 Electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution  $         (224,800) 
Reduction in payments to utilities due to electricity 
savings 
32 Natural gas distribution  $         (261,700) 
Reduction in payments to utilities due to natural 
gas savings 
331 Retail Nonstores - Direct and electronic sales  $         (568,900) 









A sensitivity analysis was performed using simple payback to determine program design features that 
would have the most impact on project performance.  A program model was developed in Microsoft 
Excel to determine the change in simple payback as individual factors were varied.  Table 17 lists the 
model assumptions used for commercial and residential projects and were meant to represent the 
“average” cost, performance, and financing mix for these two categories of projects.  Sensitivity was 
measured on payback taking into account incentives (grants and rebates).  
Table 17: Model assumptions for sensitivity analysis 
 Commercial Residential 
Project Cost $ 50,000 $ 6,900 
Loan $ 20,000 $ 3,600 
Incentive $ 26,000 $ 2,700 
Customer contribution $   4,000 $    600 
Annual energy savings $   4,000 $    650 
Loan term 60 60 
Loan interest  1.0% 0% 
 
The commercial model at the assumed values was most sensitive to project cost, followed by incentive 
and project energy savings.  It was least sensitive to loan amount, loan term, and loan interest rate. For 
example, a 5% decrease in project cost resulted in a 10% decrease in simple payback maintaining 
account incentives and loan costs constant.  
Table 18: Commercial sensitivity analysis 




Payback Payback w/ 
Incentive 
Sensitivity 
Base   12.6 6.1  
Cost  $ 47,500 -5% 12.0 5.5 -10% 
Loan $ 19,000 -5% 12.6 6.1 -0.1% 
Incentive $ 27,300 +5% 12.6 5.8 -5% 
Savings $   4,200 +5% 12.0 5.8 -5% 
Term 57 -5% 12.6 6.1 -0.1% 
Interest rate 0.95% -5% 12.6 6.1 -0.1% 
  
The residential model at the assumed values behaved in a similar manner to the commercial model and 
was most sensitive to cost, followed by incentive and project energy savings.  It was least sensitive to 
loan amount, loan term, and loan interest rate. For example, a 5% increase in energy savings resulted in 
a 5% decrease in simple payback when taking into account incentives and loan costs.  
 
 




Table 19: Residential sensitivity analysis 




Payback Payback w/ 
Incentive 
Sensitivity 
Base    10.6 6.5   
Cost $ 6,555 -5% 10.0 6.0 -8% 
Loan $ 3,420 -5% 10.6 6.5 0% 
Incentive $ 2,835 +5% 10.6 6.3 -3% 
Savings $    683 +5% 10.1 6.2 -5% 
Term 57 -5% 10.6 6.5 0% 
Interest Rate Not Analyzed 
 
Future programs should place emphasis on project cost reduction.  This would include business 
processes that take advantage of economies of scale, contractor performance monitoring, and stream-
lined project management processes.   
Energy efficiency customers appear "willing to move" with 4-5 year payback.  At these levels, it shows 
that they are more sensitive to total cost than estimated energy savings.  This suggests it would be 
useful in marketing efforts to emphasize payback period with incentives versus the energy savings on 
their own. 
 
Cash flow & Internal Rate of Return 
 
The sensitivity model was adapted to show cash flow over a 12 year period.  A 12 year period was 
chosen as a conservative expected lifetime for an energy efficiency project.  A sensitivity analysis was 
not performed on factors affecting cash flow or internal rate of return, but the purpose of this analysis 
was to provide financial projections based on real-world data from the NH BetterBuildings projects.  This 
type of financial analysis—based on actual data—could be helpful in helping to educate both 
commercial and residential customers on energy efficiency as an investment option. 
Table 20 summarizes the inputs used for the cash flow analysis for “typical” projects that did not utilize 
loans.  Table 17 from the previous section summarizes the inputs used to represent projects that did 
utilize loans and is the same inputs used for the sensitivity analysis.  It is based on customer cash 
outflows net of incentives and energy savings. 
Table 20: Inputs for “typical” projects that did not utilize loans cash flow analysis 
 Input Residential Commercial 
Project Cost $ 4,300 $ 17,400 
Loan $         0 $           0 
Incentive $ 2,300 $   9,600 
Annual Savings $    600 $   2,900 
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Both residential and commercial projects, whether or not they utilized loans, show attractive rates of 
return over a longer term investment period (seven years or greater). The rate of return for the “typical” 
loan project was less than the “typical” project that did not utilize loans due to the longer payback 
period. For example, a “typical” commercial project that utilizes loans with a 12 year expectation of 
energy savings shows a 28% internal rate of return while the “average” commercial project without 
loans had a 59% internal rate of return. It is interesting to note that for both “typical” commercial and 
residential projects that utilized loans, the annual loan payment was approximately the same as the 
annual energy cost savings.  










flow  -$1,400 $600 $600 $600 $600 $600 $600 $600 $600 $600 $600 $600 
Cumulative 
cash flow -$1,400 -$800 -$200 $400 $1,000 $1,600 $2,200 $2,800 $3,400 $4,000 $4,600 $5,200 
Internal Rate  





flow -$670 -$70 -$70 -$70 -$70 $650 $650 $650 $650 $650 $650 $650 
Cumulative 
cash flow -$670 -$740 -$810 -$880 -$950 -$300 $350 $1,000 $1,650 $2,300 $2,950 $3,600 
Internal Rate 




flow -$4,900 $2,900 $2,900 $2,900 $2,900 $2,900 $2,900 $2,900 $2,900 $2,900 $2,900 $2,900 
Cumulative 
cash flow $-4,900 -$2,000 $900 $3,800 $6,700 $9,600 $12,500 $15,400 $18,300 $21,200 $18,300 $21,200 
Internal Rate  




flow -$4,100 -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100 $4,000 $4,000 $4,000 $4,000 $4,000 $4,000 $4,000 
Cumulative 
cash flow -$4,100 -$4,200 -$4,300 -$4,400 $-4,500 $500 $3,500 $7,500 $11,500 $15,500 $19,500 $23,500 
Internal Rate  
of Return           -2% 11% 19% 23% 25% 27% 28% 
 
Incentives are an important part of the financial mix for energy efficiency projects.  For example, the 
“typical” commercial project that took a loan would have an internal rate of return of -2% to the 
business owner in year 12 if no incentives had been offered. 
 
  
                                                          
14 Cash flow includes loan payments (if applicable), incentives, energy savings and customer out-of-pocket 
payments. 





Some additional scenarios were run to help program planners understand factors and characteristics to 
be aware in program development. 
6% Loan Scenario 
 
To help understand the importance of low to no interest loans in the project financial mix, a loan that 
was closer to actual market rates was applied to the “typical” commercial and residential customer used 
in the sensitivity analysis.  Under a 6% interest rate scenario, under both the commercial and residential 
projects, the payback period increases by about half to three quarters of a year.  It has minimal impact 
on the sensitivity of the overall model, with project cost still being the most significant factor in 
determining payback. This indicates that while no to low interest may have marketing appeal; it does 
not significantly alter the financial performance of the project.  
Table 22: Model assumptions for sensitivity analysis 
 Commercial Residential 
Project Cost $ 50,000 $ 6,900 
Loan $ 20,000 $ 3,600 
Incentive $ 26,000 $ 2,700 
Savings $   4,000 $    650 
Term 60 60 
Interest  6.0% 6.0% 
 
Table 23: Commercial sensitivity analysis at 6% interest rate 







Base   6.8  
Cost  $ 47,500 -5% 6.1 -11% 
Incentive $ 27,300 +5% 6.4 -6% 
Savings $   4,200 +5% 6.5 -5% 
Term 57 -5% 6.8 -0.6% 
Interest rate 5.7% -5% 6.8 -0.6% 
  
Table 24: Residential sensitivity analysis at 6% interest rate 







Base   7.3  
Cost $ 6,555 -5% 6.7 -8% 
Incentive $ 2,835 +5% 7.1 -3% 
Savings $    683 +5% 7.0 -5% 
Term 57 -5% 7.3 -0.6% 
Interest rate 5.7% -5% 7.3 -0.6% 
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Level of Incentive 
 
Another scenario analyzed was the incentive required to get to a 3, 4, or 5 year payback for the “typical” 
commercial and residential project used in analysis (project assumptions listed in tables 17 and 20).  For 
example, the typical commercial $50,000 loan project would require a $34,000 incentive to have a four 
year payback and the typical $6,900 residential project with a loan would require a $4,950 year 
incentive to have a three year payback.   
Table 25: Incentives required for a 3, 5 and 5 year payback on “typical” projects 
Project Type Project Cost Payback (years) 
3 4 5 
Commercial Loan $50,000 $38,200  $34,300  $30,400  
Residential Loan $6,900 $4,950 $4,300 $3,650 
Commercial w/o loan $17,400 $8,700  $5,800 $2,900 
Residential w/o loan   $4,300 $2,500  $1,900 $1,300 
 
Program Cost Estimates 
 
While the projects in this program spanned a wide range, considering the “typical” project—based on 
median values—can be useful for program cost budgeting. For example, a program that was expected to 
fund 100 residential retrofits with loans would be expected to need to have a budget of between 
$365,000 and $495,000 available for incentives (based values obtained from Table 25).   For this same 
example, utilizing information from Table 10 where median loan for residential customers was $3,600, 
the program would also require a budget of approximately $360,000 for funds to be awarded as loans.  
Table 26: Modeled program costs for 100 commercial or 100 residential projects 
Project Type 
Projects Fund Requirements 
Loan No Loan Loan Incentive Total 
Commercial 
(“Main-street”) 65 35  $        1,300,000   $        2,432,500   $  3,732,500  
Residential 40 60  $            144,000   $            286,000   $     430,000  
 
Equation 1: Program Cost Formula 
ܲݎ݋݃ݎܽ݉ ܥ݋ݏݐ = ܲݎ݋݆݁ܿݐݏ௡௢ ௟௢௔௡  ×    ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁௡௢ ௟௢௔௡  +  ܲݎ݋݆݁ܿݐݏ௡௢ ௟௢௔௡  ×  (ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁௟௢௔௡ +  ܮ݋ܽ݊݁݀ ܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ) 
For example, the program cost for 100 homes (assuming 60 that do not take loans and 40 that do take 
loans with 4 year payback incentive): $430,000 = 60 ×   $1,900  +  40 × ($4,300 + $3,600) 
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Based on the mix of commercial projects that took loans (65%) in NH BetterBuildings and assuming a 
four year payback is required, the approximate program cost per 100 “main-street” commercial 
buildings is estimated to be around $4 million for loans (~30%) and incentives(~70%).  Based on the mix 
of residential projects that took loans (40%) in NH BetterBuildings and assuming a four year payback is 
required, the approximate program cost per 100 residential projects is estimated to be around $400 
thousand for loans (~30%) and incentives (~70%).   
Fuel prices 
 
While retrofit costs can be managed and planned for, fuel prices, are considerably more volatile.  The 
NH BetterBuildings program has shown that fuel prices at their current levels do not provide enough 
incentive to move energy efficiency projects forward due to the customer expectation of short payback 
periods (i.e., less than 5 years) 
Table 27 shows the energy prices required in current dollars to move projects forward without 
incentives.  For example, heating oil would need to be closer to $12 a gallon for projects to move 
forward without incentives, based on the typical energy efficiency improvements of projects that were 
analyzed.15    
Table 27: Energy cost at different paybacks based on 12.5 year baseline project payback 
   Project Payback 
Energy Type Unit Cost per unit 
3 4 5 
Natural Gas Therm $1.29  $5.38  $4.03  $3.23  
Propane Gallon 3.31 $13.79  $10.34  $8.28  
Oil Gallon 3.72 $15.50  $11.63  $9.30  
Electric kWh $0.16  $0.66  $0.50  $0.40  
Kerosene Gallon $4.19  $17.46  $13.09  $10.48  
 
To help provide context, the current average New Hampshire home that heats with oil uses 660 gallons 
per year.  At current energy prices, that is $2,455 annual cost.  To make energy efficiency attractive, 
costs would need to rise to where the average annual cost rises between $6,000 and $10,000.  This is a 
limited analysis, but shows that even within the context of current volatile energy prices, it is highly 
unlikely that a program without incentives will result in a high level of adoption. In reality, other factors 
would come into play with rising energy prices which could include consumer acceptance of longer 
payback periods.  
                                                          
15 This is a very simplified example, and is just meant to illustrate the need for incentives to move projects forward.  
The construction energy is very energy-dependent and if energy prices were to rise, so would retrofit costs.  This 
example assumes that project costs would be constant across different fuel prices. This means that energy prices 
would even need to be higher to get a 4 year payback, provided that with an increase in energy prices, retrofit 
costs were able to rise at a slower rate (e.g. a doubling of energy cost, does not double retrofit costs). 
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Lessons Learned from the BetterBuildings Program 
 
As part of the evaluation process for NH BetterBuildings, the BetterBuildings team conducted a web-
based survey that was emailed to commercial and residential customers in Berlin and Plymouth who had 
participated in energy efficiency programs. In addition, with assistance from Plymouth State University, 
in-person interviews were held with four energy efficiency contractors and technical coordinators who 
worked on the projects. The goal of the survey and interview evaluation was to assess what worked, 
what didn’t work, and solicit recommendations for improvement to help inform future potential energy 
efficiency programs in the state. It also allowed for a comprehensive look at the program by requesting 
feedback from both customers (demand side) and contractors/technical advisors (supply side).  While 
overall this was a useful evaluation mechanism, BetterBuildings management indicated that the majority 
of feedback from stakeholders was obtained during the course of the program via informal conversation 
or email communication with staff members.  
The interviews and surveys focused on customers and contractors who worked with either the original 
BetterBuildings residential program or the commercial buildings program in either Berlin or Plymouth. 
Feedback from the survey work is not representative of customers who participated in the second 
iteration of the residential program, which was a partnership between BetterBuildings and the Home 
Performance with Energy Star (HPwES) program run by the state’s utilities. 
Overall, survey respondents and interviewees indicated that the BetterBuildings program was largely 
effective at accomplishing its goals and customers expressed a high-level of satisfaction with the results. 
However, there were several common themes that pointed to potential areas for improvement. 
One central theme of comments from the contractor and technical coordinator perspective was that 
these types of programs would benefit both customers and contractors if there were better 
coordination across related programs in the state.  Typically there was overlap between BetterBuildings 
and utility energy efficiency programs for all project types, and on the commercial side, several other 
funding sources also came into play. Although overlap is not inherently negative, it is important to 
clearly communicate to customers how to maximize funding across the different programs where 
overlap does exist.    
Another key theme was the need for program marketing and to have it in place before the actual 
program was fully up and running.  While comments varied on the most effective marketing channels 
(e.g. one interviewee stated newspapers while another suggested social media but not newspapers), 
interviewees stressed the importance of leveraging local partnerships to increase exposure to the target 
market and communicate options available to customers. A challenge with programs that are grant-
funded are they typically have a limited duration which can make it difficult to develop a long-term 
sustainable memory for these constituents.  
At the customer level, contractor selection and quality consistency appeared to be a major area of 
concern. Several interviewees indicated that customers were exposed to too many contractor options 
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and that customers would benefit from a more streamlined approach to contractor selection by 
program management. Similar suggestions were made regarding the consolidation of funding sources, 
where all of the different financing programs would be applied for above the customer level. 
While contractors should be able to openly and fairly compete for business, given they are 
representatives of the program, they also should be accountable regarding competent and professional 
service.  Often multiple contractors worked on any one project, and customers frequently had mixed 
experiences with the quality of service provided by the contractors.  A beneficial practice would be for 
program management to conduct contractor performance evaluations and intervene with those 
contractors that demonstrate continued sub-standard performance.  Another approach could be to 
develop a near real-time contractor evaluation that is completed by the customer and reviewed by 
program managers as projects are underway to take corrective action as necessary. 
Finally, many customers did not understand the technical details of audit reports. A suggested practice 
could be to have a standardized audit template that provides the critical, decision relevant information 
(e.g. savings, cost) in an easy to understand format, and save the more comprehensive audit reports as 
an appendix for those customers who are interested in the details.    
A number of the concerns regarding contractors, audit reports and multiple funding sources for the 
residential program were addressed when BetterBuildings executed partnership contracts with three 
utilities that run the HPwES program in New Hampshire. Formally integrating with HPwES allowed 
BetterBuildings to merge with an existing program structure that provides a standardized, easy to read 
audit report and robust contractor oversight with the option for the customer to choose their own 
contractor, or if they prefer, to have a qualified contractor assigned by the program. The partnership 
also created a single entry point and program explanation for customers who were previously confused 
by the separate BetterBuildings and HPwES programs. 
Survey Results 
 
Web-based surveys were distributed to customers in Plymouth and Berlin at the conclusion of the 
program. Surveys were not issued to Nashua customers. Seventy-three surveys were distributed in 
Plymouth, with a response rate of 42%. In Berlin, one hundred and fifty-nine surveys were distributed, 
and the response rate was 19%. Although both surveys were issued to residential and commercial 
customers, residential customers represented the majority of survey respondents, as indicated in the 
Table 28. 
Table 28: Survey respondents by type and community 
 Plymouth Berlin 
Residential 17 55% 22 71% 
Commercial 10 32% 6 19% 
Both 1 3% 3 10% 
Other/Neither 3 10% 0 0% 
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Customers participated in the BetterBuildings program for a variety of reasons, although fuel costs 
seemed to be the primary driver. The majority of Berlin respondents (37%) participated in the program 
to reduce fuel costs, while fewer respondents aimed to take advantage of grant funds (28%), improve 
comfort (20%), and reduce emissions (12%).  
Survey results indicate that word-of-mouth marketing may have been the most effective tool to attract 
customers of the various marketing methods that were used. In Plymouth, nearly 40% of participants 
learned of the BetterBuildings program through word-of-mouth, as compared to 16% from a community 
organization or event, 13% from signs outside of homes, 10% from newspapers, and 7% each from fliers 
or online.  
Survey respondents indicated that their projects were funded by a variety of sources. In Plymouth, 60% 
of respondents funded their share of project costs with their own funds, followed by personal 
BetterBuildings loans (29%), commercial BetterBuildings loans (14%), Home Performance With Energy 
Star (11%), and other loans (4%). In Berlin, 35% of respondents funded their share of project costs with 
personal loans, followed by their own funds (32%), commercial loans (13%), Home Performance with 
Energy Star (10%), and funding from the Tri-County Community Action Program (10%).  
Another theme highlighted in the survey results was confusion surrounding the audit report. While 
respondents were generally satisfied with the audit process, several individuals expressed dissatisfaction 
with the lack of clarity of the audit report and the practicality of audit recommendations. Despite 
elements of dissatisfaction in this area, survey results indicate that receiving the audit report itself was 
critical to the eventual success of a project, as very few projects stalled after this stage. In Plymouth, for 
example, over 90% of survey respondents went forward with implementing energy improvements after 
receiving an audit report. In Berlin, over 80% of survey respondents indicated that their projects 
proceeded to completion, although it was unclear what percentage of Berlin projects did or did not 
receive audit reports.  
Overall, respondents were largely pleased with the outcomes of their projects. Respondents most 
commonly identified lower energy costs, increased comfort, and improved lighting as benefits of 
participation. In Berlin, 90% of survey respondents were either “extremely satisfied” or “very satisfied” 
with the program, and 100% of respondents were either “extremely likely” or “very likely” to 
recommend implementing energy efficiency or renewable energy to others.  In Plymouth, 87% of 
respondents indicated that they were “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the program.  
Survey respondents provided largely favorable comments about their overall satisfaction with the 
program. However, several respondents indicated certain issues with the program, including slow 
communication between program management and customers, inconsistent quality and reliability of 
contractors, and overestimated energy savings from implemented projects.  
 
  





The Plymouth BetterBuildings office partnered with Plymouth State University to conduct formal in-
person interviews with four stakeholders: two contractors, and two technical advisors. Examples of 
questions asked included:  - Were there any characteristics of the program’s structure that were particularly effective in 
helping meet its objectives? Were there any characteristics that hindered the program? - Do gaps exist that could be met by existing (or new) programs?   - What other barriers exist among the target market to investing in energy efficiency? How might 
future program services be designed to overcome those additional barriers?   
 
Interviewees indicated that certain elements of the program’s structure contributed to its ability to 
meet objectives. In particular, several individuals stated it was useful to separate the program manager 
and technical advisor role.  
One interviewee stated that it is critical to have both positions in place early on in the program’s 
implementation, especially so that the technical advisor can assist in the development of the program 
and provide input on the needs of the energy efficiency field. In one instance, waiting to hire a technical 
advisor until midway through the program’s development resulted in an overall lack of technical 
understanding and slowed down the program’s implementation.  
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Table 29: Comments on current program & recommendations for future programs 
Category Comments 
Program Design - Separating the roles of program manager and technical advisor was beneficial to the 
program 
- Program could have improved flexibility by accounting for differences in 
demographics and energy needs of local communities 
- Program duration was too short; it would benefit by being consistent, stable, and of 
longer duration 
- Program would have benefited by assessing available contractor workforce prior to 
program implementation 
- Program front-loaded audits which generated work that exceeded contractor 
capacity; the program would have benefited from a more even distribution of audits 
throughout project duration to better match contractor capacity 
- Current process was too paper-based; a centralized, web-based project submission 
process would have facilitated the sharing of project information, including required 
documentation, contact information, project status, etc. 
- Program presented too many choices in terms of contractors; a better practice may 
be to have the program manage contractor selection in the absence of customer 
preference. 
Start-Up - Key personnel need to be hired early on to aid in program development 




- The name “BetterBuildings” confused participants; the program would have 
benefited from having a name that communicated its purpose clearly 
- Word-of-mouth was most likely the most effective marketing channel in the program. 
- Local partnerships help to increase exposure to target market 
Project Financing - Consolidating funding sources may help to decrease customer confusion with funding 
options 
- Important to communicate what is and isn’t eligible for funding (e.g. health & safety 
measures) 
- Incentives help to boost customer participation, such as promotions to encourage 
early commitment 
 
Program structure and administration should also be tailored to the individual community in which the 
projects are taking place. In the instance of the BetterBuildings program, there were reportedly major 
differences between each community involved, including demographics, expectations, predominant 
energy types (e.g. heating oil vs. natural gas), incumbent energy efficiency programs, and methods of 
outreach. Interviewees advised on conducting market research prior to implementation in order to 
tailor the program to the unique characteristics of its particular region. 
One suggested component of this market research that should be undertaken was gauging the 
availability of contractor workforce. Programs need to ensure that there is a sufficient skilled labor to 
accommodate the influx of project components that occur at each stage of the program. For example, a 
significant number of energy audits were completed towards the beginning of the program, while 
contractors were in higher demand at a later point to implement the actual projects. Ensuring that there 
will be adequate labor capacity, communicating the anticipated increase in demand to applicable 
auditors and contractors, and pacing the conduction of audits all will help to ensure a timely progression 
of projects. 
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Another issue commonly cited in the interviews was the need for a centralized data submission process 
to help facilitate the documentation of required information for each project. Reportedly, too much 
information was required to be documented, and it was not stored in an easily manageable or accessible 
way. Information was largely shared via paper forms. Several interviewees recommended that future 
programs implement an online submission process so that information doesn’t get lost between 
auditors, contractors, and program administration. One piece of data that was especially onerous to 
track was Davis Bacon wage information. The ability to submit this data online would have substantially 
improved the ability to track and manage required documentation. 
Likewise, interviewees recommended that project coordination could be improved with a central 
database where various stakeholders could view the status of a project, post updates, documents, etc. It 
would have also been helpful to publish a central contact list of program managers, customers, and 
contractors to help facilitate communication across projects and cities.  
Well-planned project marketing was commonly cited as a key to overall program success. However, 
interviewees said there were several characteristics of BetterBuildings’ marketing strategy that 
detracted from effective communication and outreach. It appears that the name of the program itself 
was confusing to customers. Several interviewees suggested that the name “BetterBuildings” misled 
consumers and did not adequately communicate the objectives of the program. One interviewee 
indicated that the name led some customers to believe that the program builds energy efficient homes 
rather than provides funding options for energy efficiency upgrades.  
As for the content of marketing materials distributed to communities, interviewees referenced several 
components that contributed to strong messaging. Notably, it was helpful to include success stories as 
part of the marketing strategy. Since energy efficiency may not necessarily be a familiar topic for much 
of the target market, it is helpful to illustrate the potential benefits with actual projects, especially if 
they are local. As part of these messages, it is also important to emphasize that all homes—both old and 
new—may benefit from energy efficiency upgrades. Often, owners of newer homes think that there is 
little they can do to reduce their energy bills, while owners of older homes may feel that their homes are 
simply too old to improve.  
Income eligibility should also be a central component of marketing messages whether or not there is an 
income cap. In fact, a survey respondent cited BetterBuildings’ lack of income requirements as a positive 
attribute of the program. Clarifying eligibility and illustrating successful customer experiences can 
strengthen the marketing and attract more customers. 
With regard to the timing of marketing initiatives, several interviewees said that communication efforts 
should start well before the program actually commences. Specifically, six to eight months of exposure 
in the community beforehand was helpful in the instance of Berlin residential projects.  
Just as program management should adjust the program’s characteristics to suit the target market, 
marketing initiatives should be specifically tailored to reach the desired customer base. For example, 
certain types of media may not be as effective at reaching certain audiences. One interviewee suggested 
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that increased televised media or use of social media might be effective at attracting more participants, 
while print media was recommended only as a way to further explain the program.  
Separately, a study titled “GIS Analysis of Plymouth Better Buildings Disbursement and Projects” by 
Plymouth State University stated that “If in fact word of mouth is a key contributor to energy efficiency 
spending, although seemingly counter-intuitive, it may make sense to push advertising for the program 
in the regions where success has already been realized.” The same analysis found little correlation 
between project enrollment and customer demographics (race, gender, income, mortgage status, etc.). 
Interviewees also stated that an effective practice was to partner with local programs that already know 
the target market well. For instance, all three BetterBuildings communities partnered with the NH Retail 
Merchants Association to help gain better exposure with potential commercial customers.  
As was the case with BetterBuildings, providing funding to contractors to aid in marketing efforts can 
help expand the breadth of program outreach. On one hand, local contractors likely have well-
established relationships in a community; however one interviewee reported that it was difficult for 
contractors to reach out to customers and that program administration should be more involved with 
connecting customers with applicable contractors. 
Providing clear communication on funding options is critical to customer retention. One interviewee 
indicated that having multiple sources of funding served as a source of confusion for customers. It is 
important to communicate which elements of a project will and will not be funded under the program’s 
policies. Notably, one interviewee suggested that certain health & safety measures, including lead or 
asbestos removal, were not always covered by rebates. Such a lack of funding, if not made clear in the 
beginning, has the potential to thwart a project’s progress. 
Providing extra promotions, in addition to standard funding, can help to attract customers and secure 
retention. As an example, one promotion in the Plymouth BetterBuildings program was an extra $1,000 
if a customer made the decision to participate by a certain deadline. This promotion was cited as a 
helpful way to boost program participation. 
  





The NH BetterBuildings program was an effective energy efficiency program supporting $10.4 million in 
energy efficiency activity with $1.0 million in energy savings annually.16 The program was particularly 
strong in creating reductions in thermal load, especially a reduction in heating oil use for residential 
customers.  Over 60% of the total cost savings from projects implemented for NH residences was in 
heating oil reduction.   
The program contributed to the NH economy, supporting 144 jobs, $7.6 million in labor income in NH 
and $10.3 million in economic value-added to the NH economy.  The highest employment impact from 
this program was in the commercial and residential construction sector. 
Future programs should place emphasis on project cost reduction.  This would include business 
processes that take advantage of economies of scale, contractor performance monitoring, and stream-
lined project management processes.  Future programs should also strive for stability, consistency, and 
longevity.  While grant-based programs are effective short-term tools to drive energy efficiency projects, 
a longer-term program would increase the overall efficiency and reduce the cost of energy efficiency 
projects in the state.  
A key question posed for this analysis was what is the right mix for loans and grants in an energy 
efficiency project?  Based on the project characteristics observed, it appears that a “typical” energy 
efficiency project has a 7 to 11 year payback with no incentives.  NH BetterBuildings staff reported slow 
uptake of just a loan product, and it appears that in order for energy efficiency projects to be attractive 
to customers that it is necessary for incentives (or reduction in project cost) to bring the payback of the 
project to 4-5 years.   
Loans are an attractive financing option as they significantly reduce the upfront expenditure of a 
customer without significantly impacting the payback or return on investment of a project.  Based on 
the projects that utilized loans versus those that did not, it appears that the overall cost of the project is 
a key factor in whether or not a loan is utilized.  Specifically, loans appear to be more prevalent in higher 
cost projects than lower cost projects.   
Additional areas of research would include taking more detailed look at the characteristics of the 
projects and the types of measures that were installed to better understand the financial attributes of 
different project types.  Given that many customers do not believe the estimated savings (as uncovered 
in the surveys performed by NH BetterBuildings), research that compares actual energy reductions to 
predicted and also illustrates how energy savings risk  impacts return on investment would be a valuable 
contributor to the customer education process.  
 
                                                          
16 Based on projects analyzed, as discussed in report this is not the full portfolio of projects, but represents a 
majority. 
An Evaluation of the NH BetterBuildings Program 
30 
 
Appendix A – Study Authors 
 
Matthew Magnusson is owner of Seacoast Economics, LLC.  Seacoast Economics, LLC— formed in 
2012— provides project-based energy and economic analysis consulting services. These projects often 
involve collaboration with outside experts who assist with an aspect of the project.    
Matthew is a graduate of the University of New Hampshire's Whittemore School of Business and 
Economics with a Masters of Business Administration and currently is earning his Ph.D. in Natural 
Resources and Environmental Studies at the University. In his previous role as a Project Director II at 
Carbon Solutions New England, he guided reporting system development, procedures, and compliance 
for energy-efficiency grants awarded from the NH Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Fund.  He was 
responsible for the collection and analysis of project data, and for authorship of annual reports to the 
NH Public Utility Commission Sustainable Energy Division.   
Relevant recent research while employed as a Research Scientist at the University of New Hampshire 
includes economic modeling for a study sponsored by NRDC and Protect Our Winters “Climate Impacts 
on the Winter Tourism Economy in the United States,”  “New Hampshire’s Green Economy and 
Industries: Current Employment and Future Opportunities” performed for the Rockingham Economic 
Development Committee (REDC), “Economic Impact of Granite Reliable Power Wind Power Project in 
Coos County, New Hampshire” performed for Granite Reliable Power, LLC and the economic analysis of 
policies proposed in “The New Hampshire Climate Action Plan” performed for the NH Climate Change 
Task Force. 
Dr. Cameron Wake is actively involved in identifying and developing viable, collaborative solutions to 
address climate change in the Northeast. Over the past decade, he has focused his research at the 
University of New Hampshire on regional climate and environmental change primarily through the 
analysis of ice cores.  In addition to his role as Research Associate Professor, he is Director of Carbon 
Solutions New England (CSNE, www.CarbonSolutionsNE.org), a public-private partnership promoting 
collective action to achieve a clean, secure energy future while sustaining our unique cultural and 
natural resources. Through his work at CSNE, he has played a leadership role in the Northeast Climate 
Impacts Assessment (NECIA, www.northeastclimateimpacts.org) and served on the NH Climate Change 
Policy Task Force. Cameron also helps lead the New Hampshire Energy and Climate Collaborative, 
established to track and facilitate the implementation of New Hampshire's 2009 Climate Action Plan, of 
which he was a contributing author. 
Cameron’s outreach efforts at UNH have emphasized the need for tracking and analyzing energy data in 
order to make informed decisions about the transition to a low-carbon economy. Cameron oversaw 
CSNE’s analysis of energy savings associated with New Hampshire’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Reduction Fund. CSNE provided critical insight into the effectiveness of various projects funded by the 
program. Cameron was also involved in the development of the Small Town Carbon Calculator to help 
small municipalities track and analyze opportunities for energy and cost savings. Through these projects, 
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he has collaborated with many different stakeholders to address the environmental and economic 
opportunities associated with reducing greenhouse emissions. 
Corey Johnson is a graduate of the Paul College of Business and Economics (formerly the Whittemore 
School) at the University of New Hampshire. While in school, Corey worked with Carbon Solutions New 
England (CSNE) to help analyze energy savings associated with New Hampshire’s Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Reduction Fund. His work helped to inform CSNE’s analysis of projects funded by the program, 
including their associated environmental and financial benefits to the State of New Hampshire.  
Corey also developed, in partnership with CSNE and Clean Air-Cool Planet, the Small Town Carbon 
Calculator (STOCC). STOCC is an Excel-based tool to help small towns manage energy use, greenhouse 
gas emissions, and related expenses. Corey received a grant from UNH’s Hamel Center to implement 
STOCC throughout New Hampshire. His work involved collecting and analyzing utility data for municipal 
governments and providing actionable recommendations to local energy committees. Currently, Corey 
works as a Sustainability Research Analyst at Pax World Investments, a role in which he analyzes the 
environmental, social and governance profiles of companies considered for inclusion in Pax World’s 
mutual funds. Corey will be returning to school in the fall to pursue a Master of Environmental 
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Appendix B – Economic Modeling 
  
The technique used to estimate the economic activity in this study is called economic impact analysis. 
Economic impact analysis describes the current economic activity in a study area (such as a county, 
group of counties, state, or group of states) and it can be useful in estimating how a change—such as 
the loss of an existing industry or the addition of a new industry—would be expected to affect the wider 
local or regional economy in the study area.  Impact analysis begins with evaluating the output of 
businesses included in the analysis.  These expenditures (referred to as direct expenditures) trigger a 
series of additional spending flows throughout other sectors of the local economy as businesses  spend 
on 1) payroll and benefits, and 2) supplies, equipment, and service contracts with local vendors (referred 
to as indirect expenditures).   The purchase of goods and services from local vendors supports the hiring 
of workers at those firms and also provides funds to enable those firms to purchase additional goods 
and services from suppliers situated further down the supply chain. 
 The activity at companies involved in direct or indirect expenditures results in their employees earning 
salaries and wages.  A portion of their wages will be spent on local goods and services at different 
industries including: health care, retail, and leisure (referred to as household spending or induced 
expenditures).  This round of spending by employees helps support workers in those industries who 
then will spend portions of their incomes locally and employees triggers another round of spending, etc.   
This entire chain of spending is referred to as the  “ripple” or “multiplier” effect. The rounds of spending 
and re-spending do not continue indefinitely but typically diminish rapidly.  The impacts of the initial 
economic activity rapidly leave or “leak” out of the local economy through the imports of goods and 
services produced in other regions, savings, spending in areas outside the local economy, and taxes.  
IMPLAN (IMpact analysis for PLANing) is a system of software and databases produced by the Minnesota 
IMPLAN Group (MIG), Inc  that is widely used and accepted for local and regional economic modeling. 
IMPLAN was originally developed in 1976 by the US Forest Service, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, and the Bureau of Land Management to allow for analysis of private and public sector decisions 
on local, state and regional economic impacts.  MIG, Inc. was formed in 1993 to privatize the 
development and maintenance of IMPLAN data and software.  IMPLAN is currently in its third version. 
IMPLAN utilizes input-output (I-O) accounts to model how the more than 500 industries that comprise 
the U.S. economy interact.  Input-output (I-O) analysis quantifies the relationships of how industries 
provide input to and use output from each other. IMPLAN data and accounts follow the accounting 
conventions used by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) when developing an Input-Output (I-O) 
model of the U.S. economy as well as formats recommended by the United Nations.  
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Underlying data sources for the IMPLAN model include:   
x U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)  
o Census of Wages and Employment (CEW) 
x U.S. Department of Census  
o County Business Patterns 
o Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) 
o Construction Spending (Value Put in Place) 
x Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)  
o Regional Economic Information System (REIS) 
o National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
o Gross State Product (GSP) series 
o Output series 
The IMPLAN program uses an ordered series of steps to build the model starting with selection of a 
study-area.   The study-area can be at the county level (including multiple counties), the state level 
(including multiple states), and the national level.  The IMPLAN model allows substitution of data at each 
stage of the process which can serve to increase the robustness of the model.  The model can also have 
its import and export functions modified and industry groupings changed. IMPLAN also allows for the 
creation of aggregate models consisting of industries grouped together to streamline the modeling 
process. 
The creation of the study-area database constructs a descriptive and prescriptive model.  The 
descriptive model describes the transfer of money between industries and institutions. This model 
provides data tables on regional economic accounts that capture local economic interactions. These 
tables describe the local economy in terms of the flow of dollars from purchasers to producers within 
the study-area region. The descriptive model also produces trade flows— the movement of goods and 
services within a study-area and the outside world (regional imports and exports). 
The prescriptive model is a set of input-output multipliers that estimate total regional activity based on 
a change entered into the IMPLAN model.  Multiplier analysis is used to estimate the regional economic 
impacts resulting from a change in final demand. New industries or commodities can be introduced to 
the local economy, industries or commodities may be removed, and reports can be generated to show 
the consequences (on output, employment, and value-added) of various impacts.  Impacts include: 
output, labor income, value added, and employment.   Impacts can be in terms of direct and indirect 
effects (commonly known as Type I multipliers), or in terms of direct, indirect, and induced effects. 
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Table 30: Implan summary measures of regional economic activity 
Measure Description 
Output The value of production by industry in a calendar year. Output is measured 
by sales or receipts and other operating income plus the change in 
inventory. For retailers and wholesalers output is equal to gross margin 
not gross sales. 
Labor Income All forms of employment income, including employee compensation 
(wages and benefits) and proprietor income. 
Value Added The difference between total output and the cost of intermediate inputs.  
It is a measure of the contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
equals output minus intermediate inputs. Value added consists of 
compensation of employees, taxes on production and imports less 
subsidies, and gross operating surplus. 
Employment The annual average of monthly jobs in an industry and includes both full-
time and part-time workers. 
 
 
 
 
